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Michelangelo, theDuck and theRabbit:
Towards aRobustAccount ofModes of Existence
Juan Felipe Miranda Medina & Marisol Cristel Galarza Flores
The concept of modes of existence of semiotic entities underlies (post)Greimasian semiotics, yet it seems to
have received little attention. Modes of existence can be used in different senses. For Greimas, from the
perspective of narrative semiotics, when Michelangelo first receives a block of marble and decides to sculpt
the David, his intention is in a virtual mode; as Michelangelo progresses he ends up bringing the David into
existence, and his intention comes to the realized mode. In Fontanille’s tensive semiotics, however, modes of
existence can have to do with how one can narrow or broaden the scope of our apprehension of the David as
our eyes look at it in order to produce a meaningful experience. In this work, the perspectives of narrative and
tensive semiotics are contrasted both theoretically and practically applying both to a number of examples. In
order to identify all possible modes of existence and all the possibilities of transitioning from one to the other
in the examples presented, we resort to the method of finite-state automata from computer science. In the end,
we propose a robust narrative account of modes of existence that relies on narrative semiotics for its definition,
but into which intent and apprehension from tensive semiotics can be integrated. This work calls for the need
of establishing a syntax of modes of existence, since both Greimas and Fontanille construe them as being
necessary to account for the production of signification.
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In every block of marble I see a statue
as plain as though it stood before me,
shaped and perfect in attitude and action.
I have only to hew away the rough walls
that imprison the lovely apparition
to reveal it to the other eyes as mine see it.
Michelangelo (cited in Shaikh & Leonard-Amodeo, 2005, p. 75)
1. Introduction: Modes of existence... of what?
The David, a statue more than 5m tall, was sculpted by Michelangelo from a large piece of marble
known as “The Giant”. The marble block had laid in oblivion for years after a failed attempt to
sculpt it by two other artists (Tilmans, 2011). Michelangelo, however, taking advantage of his
exceptional artistic competence, managed to realize1 the existence of the David, to bring it forward
from what appeared to be a spoiled block of marble. Michelangelo’s own metaphor of “hewing
away the walls” that imprisoned the David, points to a different mode of existence in which the
David found itself prior to its sculpting: the virtual mode. While the concept of modes of existence
1 Although the two modes, from a linguistic perspective, are usually referred to as virtual and actualized,
naming the latter mode realized allows it to be conceptually coherent with Greimas’s triad
virtual/actualized/realized (see Section 2).
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can certainly be applied to metaphysics (i.e., to what exists or could exist)2 in this work it is applied
to semiotic entities—e.g., to a language, a painting, a catchy song, or anything from which
signification can be produced.
The theoretical examination of modes of existence this work undertakes is carried out from
the standpoint of (post)Greimasian semiotics, developed most notably by Algirdas Julien Greimas
and Jacques Fontanille. This work considers three main perspectives of modes of existence. In the
first one, illustrated by the example of the block of marble and the statue of the David, two modes
of existence are acknowledged: the virtual, which refers to a system comprising a number of
possibilities, and the realized, which refers to the act of bringing into existence some of these
possibilities by means of practice.3
The second perspective refers to the theory of narrative semiotics developed by Greimas
(1987), which offers a different account of modes of existence which, as we suggest in Section 5, is
coherent with theories of intentional action. The dynamics of narrative semiotics is best illustrated
by the canonical schema of the subject on a quest, where the subject embarks on a quest for an
object of desire, acquiring gifts and facing challenges in order to attain it (Greimas, 1987; Fontanille,
2006, p. 31). In this process the subject traverses three modes of existence—from virtual, to
actualized, to realized. However, in order to account for passions and for the sensible aspect of
subjectivity, Greimas and Fonanille (1991) would later introduce a fourth mode, the potentialized.
The third perspective comes from Fontanille’s tensive semiotics, which although deeply
grounded on narrative semiotics, is substantially different from the latter. Modes of existence in this
case are conceived as modulations of presence, and formulated as variations in the levels of intent
and apprehension by a subject. In so doing, Fontanille aims to advance a more comprehensive
description of the interaction between sensible and cognitive aspects of meaning production
compared to Greimas. This article takes The Semiotics of Discourse (2006) as the main reference
for Fontanille’s theory of modes of existence since it provides one of the most comprehensive
accounts on this matter from the perspective of tensive semiotics, although several other of his
writings have been considered (Fontanille, 2017a, 2017b, 2018; Fontanille & Zilberberg, 2017).
The purpose of this article is to invite the reader to a theoretical reflection on modes of
existence in the scope of (post)Greimasian semiotics, but with a particular orientation towards
intentional action—a specific case of which is interpretation. Section 2 presents Greimas’s approach
to modes of existence both from a linguistic and a narrative perspective; emphasizing modalities,
competence and junction as concepts from which modes of existence can be formally defined.
Section 3 addresses Fontanille’s account of modes of existence from the outlook of three different
definitions, formulated in terms of (1) the tensive correlation, (2) modalities, and (3) co-existence.
We focus on the notion of ascending and descending trajectories, and by means of examples we
point out what we believe are inconsistencies between these three definitions. In tandem with our
presentation of modes of existence in Sections 2 and 3, we develop examples to clarify fundamental
concepts and relevant issues. The examples that are addressed from the perspective of narrative
semiotics are analyzed by means of a method specifically deployed in computer science to
formalize syntax; namely, finite-state automata (FSA) using directed graphs (Hopcroft et al., 2006).
This will set a common framework to study and compare rigorously the different definitions of
2 In his Metaphysics, Aristotle already identified two modes of existence (potentiality and actuality) in his
account of change which are equivalent to virtual and actualized. Morover, Aristotle in fact illustrated the
actualization of potentiality as a bronze statue taking form (Barnes, 1984; Cohen, 2020).
3 A classical example of the application of modes of existence to language is Saussure’s distinction between
langue (an abstract system composed of linguistic signs) and parole (the utterances produced by making use
of this system) (Martin & Ringham, 2000).
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modes of existence that we engage with.4 On this basis, in Section 4, we provide an account of
modes of existence which we believe overcomes some of the limitations in the theories of Greimas
and Fontanille.
2. Greimas: Modes of existence from the perspective of narrative semiotics
Greimas is one of the few semioticians to place modes of existence at the core of his semiotic
theory (Fontanille, 2006). For Greimas, modes of existence can be understood from two different
outlooks. The first one, which corresponds to the viewpoint of linguistics, acknowledges two
different modes: virtual and realized (see footnote 1). The virtual refers to language as a system,
that is, existence in absentia. The utterance, on the other hand, corresponds to the realization of
possibilities present in the system through the act of enunciation—i.e., existence in praesentia
(Martin & Ringham, 2000, p. 21). For example, from all possible word combinations that the
English language allows, we can realize a few in the utterance I love semiotics. The second outlook,
that of narrative semiotics, distinguishes between three modes of existence: the virtual, the
actualized and the realized. In order to properly address the difference between these three modes,
however, we must first discuss the relation between modes of existence and modalities, one of
Greimas’s most original contributions.
2.1. Modalities
In the relevant, sense, modality can be defined as “the modification of a predicate by a subject”
(Greimas, 1987, p. 121), or as that which overdetermines basic statements or utterances (Marting &
Ringham, 2000, p. 86). Modalities involve expressions such as wanting, having to, ought, may, etc.
(ibid.). For example, consider the utterances in (1-3).
(1) I dance salsa.
(2) I know how to dance salsa.
(3) I want to know how to dance salsa.
In this case, utterance (2) corresponds to utterance (1) modalized once, while (3) adds a
modalization to (2) and is therefore (1) modalized twice. In addition, Greimas distinguishes
between utterances of doing, which correspond to the function of transformation, and utterances of
state, which correspond to the function of junction. Junction “is the relation that determines the
‘state’ of the subject with regard to any sort of object of value”, and it can take two values:
conjoined or disjoined (Greimas, 1987, p. 123). In the utterance of state in (4) Rose corresponds to
the subject, John to the object, and loves indicates that subject and object are conjoined. An
example of a modalized version of this utterance would be the utterance in (5). Conversely, (6-7)
are examples of utterances of doing, since riding a horse is an action and it therefore corresponds to
transformation.
(4) Rose loves John.
(5) Rose wants to love John.
4 The kind of automata being used in this work is neither Turing machines, nor pushdown automata; but rather
finite state automata that may taken to be deterministic or not deterministic. For a comprehensive overview of
the method refer to Hopcroft et al. (2006), Singh (2019), Caroll & Long (1989) or Hollos & Hollos (2013).
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(6) Rose rode that horse.
(7) Rose had to ride that horse.
Establishing a definite typology of modalities is a complex enterprise (Sulkunen & Törrönen,
1997) and is out of the scope of the present article. Greimas distinguishes between the following
types of modalities, all arranged into groups of four and related by the four elementary
combinations of the semiotic square (Greimas & Rastier, 1968) under the general form (i) f-ing-to-
do/be, (ii) its opposite, f-ing-not-to-do/be, and the contradictory terms (iii) not-f-ing-to-do/be, and
(iv) not-f-ing-not-to-do/be:
 Veridictory modalities: being, seeming, non-being, non-seeming.
 Alethic modalities: necessity (having-to-be), impossibility (having-not-to-be), contingency
(not-having-to-be) and possibility (not-having-not-to-be).
 Deontic modalities: prescription (having-to-do), prohibition (having-not-to-do), optionality
(not-having-to-do), permission (not-having-not-to-do)
 Factitive modalities: causing-to-do, causing-not-to-do, not-causing-to-do, not-causing-not-to-
do.
As Greimas points out, “all naming [of specific modalities] is arbitrary, although it can be more or
less semantically motivated” (Greimas, 1987, p. 129)—e.g., what is essential to the modality of
necessity is not that it is named “necessity”, but rather its modalized definition as having-to-be.
2.2. The relation between modalities and modes of existence
Narrative semiotics requires three modes of existence (i.e., virtual, actualized and realized) “in
order to describe accurately all possible kinds of junction between a Subject and an Object” (Martin
& Ringham, 2000, p. 21).5 Before any junction has been specified, Subject and Object are in a
virtual position respect to each other. When Subject and Object are conjoined (i.e., when junction
has taken place) their position is realized, but when they are disjoined, their position is actualized
(ibid.).
Table 1 shows the correspondence between modalities and modes of existence according to
Greimas. The virtual mode of existence is specified by virtualizing modalities (having-to, wanting),
the actualized mode by the actualizing modalities being-able and knowing, and performance by the
realizing modalities causing-to-be (doing) and being. The virtual and actualized modes of existence
correspond to the phase of developing the competence necessary for performance.
5 Here, and in further references, the terms Subject and Object are written in capital letters because they
correspond to technical terms in Greimas’s narrative semiotics; specifically, to actants in the actantial
narrative schema (see Section 2.3).
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Table 1. Definition of modes of existence in terms of modalities according to Greimas
(Greimas & Courtés, 1979/1990, p. 132)
Competence Performance
modes of
existence virtual actualized realized
modalities: virtualizing actualizing realizing
exotactic: having-to being-able causing-to-be
endotactic: wanting knowing being
2.3. Competence and the actantial model
Greimasian narrative semiotics articulates the narrative schema (i.e., the sequencing of the narrative
process towards or away from realization, which directly involves modes of existence) with the
actantial model (i.e., the model that accounts for the sequencing in the form of abstract entities
called actants). Actants “are the forces and roles necessary for the accomplishment of a process” of
action and/or signification (e.g., the characters of a plot, the nominal syntagms of a sentence, or the
actors and roles of a play) (Fontanille, 2006, p. 95). The actantial model is composed of three pairs
of actants: Sender/Receiver, Subject/Object and Helper/Opponent (Greimas & Courtés, 1979/1990,
p. 24; Hébert, 2006a).
Though there are many canonical narrative schemas (Fontanille, 2006, p. 71), the most
representative one, and the one that best fits the process of intentional action, is the subject on a
quest. In this schema, a Sender manipulates a Receiver into engaging in a quest for an Object of
value. Manipulation can take a number of forms depending on the narrative: seduction, persuasion,
argumentation, blackmailing, etc. The Receiver accepts the Sender’s request by signing a contract
where the Object of value is agreed upon (in intentional action the Object corresponds to the
intention itself), and thus the Receiver becomes a Subject on a quest for an Object (or equivalently a
Subject with an intention of action), acquiring the virtualizing modalities (having-to-do and/or
wanting-to-do). It is fundamental to understand that realization—i.e., the Subject becoming
conjoined with the Object—does not depend exclusively on the Subject’s performance, but is
ultimately determined by the sanction of the Sender. This results in the following three fundamental
features of competence (Miranda Medina, 2020, p. 2):
1. Competence “implies that a competent Subject S possesses certain characteristics (e.g.,
adequacy, knowledge, skill or capacity), or that the Subject is capable of performing certain
tasks”, which is expressible in terms of the modalities being-able-to-do and knowing-how-to-
do (Section 2.2, Table 1).
2. Competence requires sanction, that is, it requires that a transcendent entity that is outside of
the action process itself (the Sender) confirms that S possesses those characteristics, or that S
performed the task as required.
3. The characteristics or the performance that allow the sanction S is competent are not universal,
but rather specific to a situation or narrative.
In terms of intentional action, this means that intention is not only present as a motivation at
the beginning of the action/narrative process (virtualization), but it rather follows through the whole
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process: it determines what sort of competence is relevant, and it is the measure to judge if the
action was successful or not—this topic is re-examined in greater depth in Section 4.1.
2.4. Passions and the potentialized mode of existence
Greimas and Fontanille coauthored The Semiotics of Passions (1991), a seminal book which would
extend the reach of narrative semiotics to account for passions such as greed, jealousy or envy. As
before, the formulation of these passions relies on states of conjunction/disjunction between a
Subject and an Object, though Subject-Subject relations play a paramount role. Both kinds of
relations may now be associated to the pathemic states of euphoria or disphoria (e.g.,
liking/dislinking, enjoying/suffering). However, the passional Subject is now capable of undergoing
these states not only by taking part in conjunctions and disjunctions, but rather by imagining them,
or, using the technical term, by running simulacra. Jealousy, for example, consists of a jealous lover
that imagines with suffering the scene of someone else securing the love of their paramour.
Technically, the jealous Subject S1 runs a simulacrum of a narrative sequence where another
Subject S2 becomes conjoined with the love of X, which introduces a state of disphoria in S1.
But what has this to do with modes of existence? Greimas and Fontanille calculated that there
should exist a potentialized mode (ibid., pp. 123–124), as shown in Figure 1, and they attributed to
it, though not without speculation, the Subject’s “passional disposition”, that is, its faculty to run
simulacra. They determined that this new mode ought to lie between competence and performance
(i.e., between the actualized and realized modes). On this account, the ordered sequence of modes
of existence would be: virtualized >> actualized >> potentialized >> realized.
In our view, it is never clear why the junction function is assumed to take four possible
values, instead of two or three. In other words, why should not-conjoined be different from
disjoined, and conversely, not-disjoined be different from conjoined? The definition of the
opposition conjoined–disjoined seems to be rather obscure, and apparently Fontanille himself was
not satisfied with this formulation since, as we shall see in Section 3, in his later semiotics he
redefines the potentialized mode both in its utility and in its position in the ordered sequence.
Figure 1. Semiotic square representing the relation between conjunction/disjunction and modes of
existence (R: realized, A: actualized, P: potentialized, V: virtualized) as expounded in
the Semiotics of Passions (Greimas & Fontanille, 1991, pp. 39, 48, 118)
2.5. Key points on modes of existence according to Greimas
The following key points will be relevant to work out the examples that follow and to understand
the robust account on modes of existence presented in Section 4.2:
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A. Performance presupposes competence (Greimas, 1987, p. 132), which means that Subject and
Object can only be in the realized mode passing first through the actualized mode. In other
words, actualization implies meeting all conditions necessary for performance in the form of
being-able-to-do and/or knowing-how-to-do.
B. Exotactic modalities relate different subjects while endotactic modalities relate identical or
syncretic subjects (Greimas & Courtés, 1969/1990, p. 263). This distinction is important,
because relying on §A, and referring specifically to actualization, we have that being-able-to-
do refers to any external conditions that enable the Subject to perform, while knowing-how-to-
do refers to the conditions intrinsic to the Subject that enable it to perform. For example, if
James can dance tap but only with his tap shoes on, then James already possesses the knowing-
how-to-do, but the tap shoes constitute the being-able-to-do in the case of dancing. In fairy
tales, the being-able-to-do is typically provided by gods or fairies that endow the Subject on a
quest with gifts.
C. The Subject and the Object mutually define each other. For Greimas, there can be no Subject
without an Object, nor an Object without a Subject.
D. The Object functions as a determination of the Subject, regardless of the position they hold in
terms of modes of existence. Whether it is the case that Rose is a good dancer or that Rose
wants to be a good dancer, being-a-good-dancer determines Rose as a Subject. Were it not for
this predicate we would know nothing about Rose in this example.
E. Realization, i.e., the conjunction between Subject and Object, is mediated by performance.
Performance is in most cases not an end in itself, but rather what the Subject does in order to
become conjoined with the Object of value. For example, when you say that you want to buy a
car, buying is not actually what you desire. If it turns out that the car is faulty, you will most
likely feel unsatisfied because what you actually wanted was to own a car that works, and
buying was the performance required from your part in order to realize your intention.
F. The fact that §E: realization is mediated by performance, and that §A: performance
presupposes competence, implies that the Subject requires a strategy in order to achieve
junction with the Object. That is, the Subject first has to determine what sort of performance is
required to bring about this junction, and what are the preconditions in order to be able to
perform. The acting Subject is thus faced with a set of possibilities determined by the intention
or Object of desire.
G. Competence requires sanction, and it is therefore ultimately the Sender (i.e., the intention) that
in sanctioning determines if the Subject and the Object become realized or not.
H. There is a congruence between Greimas’s linguistic and narrative accounts of modes of
existence. The virtual in the linguistic sense constitutes a system governed by certain rules that
allows a determined set of possibilities—i.e., it allows some possibilities and excludes others.
In virtue of §F, the Subject that is in a virtual position respect to its Object has a set of
possibilities in front of itself determined by what the Object is, and what sort of performance is
required to become conjoined with it.
The examples presented in the following subsection will illustrate these points better, as well
as the deployment of the finite-state automata (FSA) method.
2.6. Example I: Mate in two
Before any piece is played, an estimate of ten to the power of hundred and twenty three different
games are possible in the game of chess. The number of possible games, however, narrows down
with every play as the game in question progresses. Imagine Jane and Mary playing chess. At first
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the match is close and the competition fierce, but there comes a point where Jane correctly notices
that she can execute a mate in two moves. In spite of her insight, Jane must be cautious: making the
wrong move can imply delaying the mate, or, in the worst case, missing the chance to mate thus
loosing the game. These possibilities are summarized in the graph using the FSA method as shown
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Graph representation of the different possibilities for the example in Figure 4
Right before the game starts the possibility of Jane winning the game is in a virtual mode.
When Jane correctly sees the possibility of “mate in 2”, her intention of giving a check mate is
actualized (all conditions are given for her to win). If Jane makes a bad play, though, she will lose
the game and her chance for a mate becomes unrealized. If she makes a move that is neither optimal
nor fatal, she may win the game with a few additional moves (her chance for mate remains
actualized). Her intent of winning the game becomes realized when the checkmate move is carried
out.
In the FSA method here employed, modes of existence (represented by circles) constitute
states. A state is simply a point of transition that may connect to other states, but not necessarily to
all others—i.e., given a state, some transitions are possible, others are impossible. States that are
marked by a double circle (such as “mate impossible”) represent terminal states, that is, states
where the process may end without the need to transition to any other state. There can only be one
initial state (in this case “game start”) represented by a circle preceded by a short arrow. But what
motivates the transition from one state to another? In the context of computer science this would be
the taking of a character from a previously defined alphabet of symbols. In the case of narrative
semiotics this could refer to an event or a process the Subject undergoes—in the general case of the
subject on a quest, for example, the transition from actualized to realized would have performance
as its event. In this specific case, although not shown in Figure 2, these events would be the act of
moving a piece in the chessboard by Jane and Mary. In general, an automaton is fully determined
by (Hopcroft et al., 2006): (1) the initial state (“game start”), (2) the alphabet or list of events that
may cause a transition (e.g., moving pieces in the chess board), (3) the transition function (the
arrows), (4) the full list of states, and (5), the terminal states (“mate impossible” and “checkmate!”).
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2.7. Example II: Hamlet
The course of events in Shakespeare’s masterpiece Hamlet can be explained with the schema of the
subject on a quest (Greimas et al., 1990; Fontanille, 2006, pp. 73-77). This example focuses
specifically on the encounter between the Sender (the Ghost) and the Receiver (prince Hamlet),
which we refer to as the state/mode of possibility. This mode, insofar as it is prior to the virtual, that
is, to any relation of desire between a Subject and an Object, is characterized by an indetermination
propper to the first sensible encounter.
In the case of Hamlet, the first ones to meet the ghost of King Hamlet are prince Hamlet’s
acquaintances. Uncertain of what the figure before them is, they refer to it as “the apparition”
(Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 1, Shakespeare, 1600):
MARCELLUS
Horatio says ’tis but our fantasy
And will not let belief take hold of him
Touching this dreaded sight twice seen of us.
Therefore I have entreated him along
With us to watch the minutes of this night,
That if again this apparition come
He may approve our eyes and speak to it. (...)
Enter GHOST.
MARCELLUS
Peace, break thee off. Look where it comes again!
BARNARDO
In the same figure like the king that’s dead.
MARCELLUS
(to HORATIO) Thou art a scholar. Speak to it, Horatio.
BARNARDO
Looks it not like the king? Mark it, Horatio.
HORATIO
Most like. It harrows me with fear and wonder.
Even if Horatio valiantly approaches the apparition and commands it to speak, the apparition
will not reveal what or who it is to them. This can be compared to the first encounter with the
rabbit-duck drawing (see Section 3.4), though in the case of Hamlet effectively making sense of the
apparition does not depend exclusively on the will of Horatio and his comrades, but rather on an
interaction with the Ghost that does not take place. The Ghost will eventually speak, but to no one
else than prince Hamlet himself (Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 4, ibid.):
HAMLET
Angels and ministers of grace defend us!
Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damned,
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Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell,
Be thy intents wicked or charitable,
Thou comest in such a questionable shape
That I will speak to thee. I’ll call thee “Hamlet,”
“King,” “Father,” “royal Dane.” O, answer me!
Let me not burst in ignorance, but tell
Why thy canonized bones, hearsed in death,
Have burst their cerements (...)
GHOST
I am thy father’s spirit,
Doomed for a certain term to walk the night
And for the day confined to fast in fires,
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature
Are burnt and purged away.
Prince Hamlet’s first reaction is to express fearful wonder upon the ghost. When Hamlet
manages to overcome fear to recognize the semblance of his father in the apparition, the Ghost then
reveals itself: “I am thy father’s spirit”. The intensity of the first sensible encounter was not enough
for prince Hamlet to make sense of the apparition. It was rather the interaction that took place
between himself and his father’s ghost that proved his suspicions right. Nonetheless, the initial
intensity of the encounter was key in the Sender-Receiver manipulation, i.e., in the Ghost
convincing prince Hamlet to kill Claudius so that he may rest in peace. In this case it is not clever
argumentation, but affect, that accomplished manipulation.
If the first impression of the Ghost upon prince Hamlet corresponds to possibility as a mode
of existence, after accepting the Ghost’s wishes Hamlet enters a virtual mode regarding his
intention (that the soul of King Hamlet rests in peace). Killing his uncle, the murderer of his father,
is the performance required to fulfill the intention, and madness will be prince Hamlet’s main actant
Helper in his quest. This example illustrates how the mode of possibility, of sensible encounter,
allows us to effectively furnish the actantial Subject with a sensibility that ultimately leads to the
construction of an intention, and to its subsequent fulfillment by means of performance.
2.8. Example III: Michelangelo’s David
In Section 1, Michelangelo’s sculpture David was used to introduce the notion of modes of
existence, and here we develop it in light of the perspective of narrative semiotics.
In this example, the actant Sender is the Guild of Wool Merchants of Florence who, in 1501,
approached Michelangelo to offer him the commission of sculpting the David (Shaikh & Leonard-
Amodeo, 2005). Perhaps negotiations went back and forth, or perhaps Michelangelo accepted
without hesitation, but we know that Michelangelo ended up accepting the commission, and thus
became a Subject that desires an Object of value. However, it is important to have clarity about
what the Object of value actually is—i.e., what the intention driving the action is. For the sake of
this example we can say that Michelangelo’s desire was to sculpt a statue of the biblical figure of
David that was highly appreciated by his commissioners from the marble stone that was given to
him. A different motivation, and very frequent among artists, is that the Object or intention is rather
to produce an artwork they can feel proud of.
In Section 2.5 (A) it was established that performance presupposes competence. Did
Michelangelo already possess all the knowledge to sculpt the David? (i.e., the endotactic actualizing
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modality). Did he already have all of the tools required for him to be able to sculpt such a large
piece of marble? (i.e., the exotactic actualizing modality). Although Michelangelo was already a
seasoned artist at the time of accepting the commission, he was also known to have studied anatomy.
Even though “direct anatomical dissection was forbidden during the Renaissance”, fashioning a
life-sized wooden crucifix altarpiece for the Santo Spirito in Florence allowed Michelangelo to
access bodies awaiting burial (Shaikh & Leonard-Amodeo, 2005, p. 75). Many of his works
demonstrate his enthusiasm and mastery of anatomy, to the point of standing as models for artists
for centuries to come. Conversely, in this example we can assume that Michelangelo was able to
acquire the existing tools required to carve large marble stones. The third pair of actants, the Helper
and the Opponent, refer to things or events that affect the Subject’s process of gaining competence
positively or negatively. For example, the stipend that Michelangelo received from his
commissioners was a Helper (it allowed him to acquire tools), while an event such as getting sick
would be an Opponent.
Figure 3 represents the action/narrative process of Michelangelo sculpting the David relying
on certain assumptions. Greimas’s triad of modes of existence—virtual (V), actualized (A) and
realized (R)—as well as the direct transition from V to A, and A to R is made explicit in the figure
by the bold arrows. The process of gaining competence, i.e., of transitioning from V to A,
contemplates acquiring sculpting tools and studying anatomy as two separate processes. Note,
however, that since the process of sculpting goes over several years, there is no clear demarcation
between A and R, but rather a feedback loop: Michelangelo studies anatomy, then sculpts, studies
some more, and continues sculpting. Note as well that the last stage includes sanction by the
commissioner. If the commissioner is satisfied with the sculpture, then Michelangelo becomes
conjoined with the intention of producing a sculpture of David that the commissioner likes. Even
though the Sender actant is a transcendent entity in relation to the Subject actant, the Subject as an
actor can include both the Sender and Subject actants. That is to say, had the intention been to
produce a sculpture he approved of himself, Michelangelo would have been the final judge of his
own work, and thus the one that determined whether the intention was realized or not.
Figure 3 illustrates a number of possibilities of what can go wrong for Michelangelo. He
might be so stressed with the commission that he gets nervous breakdown and never finishes the
work; he might make a mistake sculpting but that fortunately can be compensated for with the
proper sculpting techniques; he might even be so unlucky that in the process of sculpting he breaks
the stone, in which case the intention never becomes realized; or he might finish the commission
but his work is not appreciated by the commissioner.
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Figure 3. Representation of Michelangelo’s (M) process of sculpting the statue of David and the
different possibilities along the process in terms of modes of existence. X stands for the commissioner.
PS: possibility (refers to the phase of manipulation), V: virtual, A: actualized, R: realized, U:
unrealized
2.9. Modes of existence according to Greimas: a first interpretation
The diverse possibilities present in the different stages of the action process of Michelangelo
sculpting the David, as well as their relation to the modes of existence discussed so far, were
represented in Figure 3 using the FSM method.
A generalized systematization of Greimas’s modes of existence is represented in Figure 4.
The figure recognizes the Greimasian triad of virtual/actualized/realized (V/A/R), but includes
previously the mode of possibility (PS), corresponding to manipulation, and most importantly,
unrealized junction between the Subject and the Object is acknowledged as an additional mode of
existence. Even though the mode of possibility is accounted for by Greimas in the phase of
manipulation, when applied to intentional action it is useful to include this mode that precedes any
determination of intention.
Figure 4.Modes of existence applied to intentional action based on Greimas’s narrative semiotics. The
representation method uses graphs applied to finite-state automata (FSA)
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3. Fontanille: Modes of existence from the perspective of tensive semiotics
Greimas’s approach towards the semiotic subject is essentially pragmatic, i.e., action-based.
Fontanille, on the other hand, seeks to endow the Subject with sensible and aesthetic capacities that
are central to the process of producing signification (Fontanille, 2017a, 2017b). According to
Fontanille, the body is the minimal actant that occupies the “center of reference of the discourse”—
understanding discourse not merely as text, but rather as the world of signification in which
semiotic subjects (i.e., subjects capable of producing signification) are immersed (Fontanille, 2006,
p. 59).6 Semiotics must rely on a theory of modes of existence in order to be able to specify the
status of semiotic entities, but the distinction between modes of existence, Fontanille argues, ought
to rely on a single category: presence (“the sensible quality par excellence”) is thus the point of
articulation between modes of existence and the tensive structure, which lies at the core of
Fontanille’s semiotics (Fontanille, 2006, p. 14, p. 35). Understanding modes of existence as
modulations of degrees of presence allows Fontanille to posit the co-existence of semiotic entities in
discourse—as opposed to their mere co-presence—thus endowing discourse with “thickness”.
Furthermore, depending on their level of presence, semiotic entities exert a “pressure to exist”,
pushing, as it were, to become realized (ibid., 2006, p. 88).
3.1. Presence and modes of existence
Fontanille’s theory acknowledges the three modes of existence proposed by Greimas in his
narrative semiotics (i.e., virtual/actualized/realized), while putting forward two additional modes
(potentialized/virtualized). In Fontanille’s view, these additional modes become necessary because
the act of signification results from the interplay of two fundamental tensions between what is
outside and inside of the field of discourse, namely (Fontanille, 2006, p. 199):
1. A tension from virtual to realized, mediated by the actualized, which corresponds to te
ascending trajectory.
2. A tension from realized to virtualized, mediated by the potentialized, which corresponds to the
descending trajectory.
Both tensions complement each other during the process of producing signification: when a
semiotic entity becomes realized respect to a perceiving subject, another entity is sent back to the
virtualized stage. Interpretation, in fact, consists of coming and going from one to the other (ibid.).
In this coming an going, Fontanille maintains there are two possible transitions between modes of
existence in the ascending trajectory (virtual to actualized, and actualized to realized) and two in
6 While Subject, with a capital “S”, refers to the Subject in the context of Greimas’s actantial model, by
semiotic subject I refer to the subject immersed in the world and in constant interaction with it, that is, a
subject that experiences and produces signification out of the world. This may refer to individual or collective
experiences in specific situations or in everyday life—e.g., dancing at a party, or walking around the main
square. The semiotic subject is also present in written narratives in general. In this case, the world in which
the subject is immersed in refers to written discourse (i.e., to the written text that tells us the story or narrative
in which the subject, possibly one of many, takes part). Novels are good examples of “worlds of discourse” in
which several subjects partake, where each has different intentions, experiences and interactions with their
world and with other subjects.
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the descending trajectory (realized to potentialized, potentialized to realized)—although this will be
contested in Section 4.2. The relation between tensions, trajectories and transitions is summarized in
Table 2.
Table 2. Tensions, trajectories and transitions of modes of existence in tensive semiotics. V
refers to the virtual mode of existence, V2 to the virtualized, A to actualized, R to realized and P
to the potentialized mode.
Tensions Trajectories Transitions
From virtual to realized Ascending trajectory
virtual to actualized V >> A
actualized to realized A >> R
From realized to virtualized Descending trajectories
realized to potentialized R >> P
potentialized to virtualized P >>V2
The interplay between the two tensions in relation to a semiotic subject embedded in a field
of discourse—the field in which processes relating the sensible to the inteligible take place— is
represented in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Modes of existence characterize the tensions between what is outside and inside of the field
of discourse of a sensible subject (virtual/realized and realized/virtualized). Note: this figure is an
adaptation of Fontanille’ illustration (2006, p. 199) by Prof. in semiotics José García Contto (personal
communication, October 20, 2020)
It should be stressed that Fontanille’s definition of the potentialized mode is substantially
different from the definition presented in the Semiotics of Passions (Section 2.4) on two grounds.
First, Fontanille defines the potentialized mode as the mediator in the transition from realized to
virtualized; not as the mode that enables the Subject to run simulacra from which passions arise.
Second, regarding the order of modes of existence, the potentialized mode is shifted one mode
further away from the realized. Thus, for Fontanille the order of modes of existence, sorted
according to their degree of presence, is: virtual/virtualized >> potentialized >> actualized >>
realized.
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3.2. Three definitions of modes of existence according to Fontanille
Explaining modes of existence as modulations of presence, allows Fontanille to formulate three
definitions on modes of existence that should in principle be congruent—the theoretical exposition
of these definitions, as well as the examples addressed in this section, will, however, show that in
some cases they seem to be incongruent, or that they might refer to different things. The first one is
from the viewpoint of the tensive structure (what we call the tensive correlation), the second one
from that of modalities, and the third one is a set of explanatory definitions for each mode.
3.2.1. Definition 1: Modes of existence in terms of intent and apprehension
From the perspective of the tensive structure, presence engages the two following “elementary
semiotic operations” (ibid., pp. 11, 14--15):
1. Intent, which refers to the sensible (the plane of content), to affect, to the perception
and sensibility to presence. Intent varies in intensity, guiding and directing “the flux of
attention” under the control of intention.
2. Apprehension refers to the inteligible (the plane of expression); it sets the boundaries
of the “domain of pertinence of the signifying process”. It varies in extension in terms
of position, magnitude, area or quantity.
The sensible body correlates intent and apprehension in its taking of position (assuming a
point of view). The tensive correlation, as we shall henceforth refer to it—i.e., the correlation of
relative degrees of intensity with relative degrees of apprehension—results in the emergence of four
typical zones (ibid., p. 42), each of which corresponds to a specific mode of existence (see Table 3).
Signification, Fontanille maintains, arises from tensive schemas, that is, from sequences of tensive
correlations that can in turn be combined to form larger units (canonical schemas) that become
recognizable by a culture (ibid., p. 66-70)—an example of which is the subject on a quest (refer to
Section 1).
Table 3.Modes of existence as a function of levels of
intent and apprehension (Fontanille, 2006, p. 89)
Intense Intent Weakened Intent
Extended Apprehension realized potentialized
Restricted Apprehension actualized virtualized
The first of approach to apply tensive correlation to modes of existence is to conceive of
tensive correlations as modes of presence. Table 3 is used by Fontanille in his study of rhetorical
figures to characterize the relation between what is given in the plane of expression and what ends
up being intended by the interpreting subject (refer to the example on irony in Section 3.3). This,
however, is only the first of two approaches in the application of the tensive correlation.
The second approach, which in our view is better at differentiating tensive from narrative
semiotics, is explained by Fontanille (2006, p. 84), but it is not explicitly distinguished in its
applicability, nor deployed extensively in his examples on modes of existence. In this alternative
approach, the tensive correlation is used to define a typology of points of view, given that the point
of view introduces an an imperfect apprehension, but at the same time allows for its compensation
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by mediating/controlling the correlation of levels of intent (in terms of intensity) and levels of
apprehension (in terms of scope, or extension of perception). The resulting combinations or
strategies are summarized in Table 4. The englobing strategy holds a globalizing pretension
apprehending the object as a whole or gestalt (apprehension is extended and the intent is intense),
while the particularizing strategy focuses on a specific feature or element of the object without
holding the intention of apprehending it in its wholeness (thus apprehension is restricted and intent
is weakened). The elective strategy focuses on one aspect of the object regarded to represent the
whole (therefore apprehension is restricted but the intent is intense), while the cumulative strategy
apprehends the object as a collection of parts, synthesizing, as it were, these restricted intents to
form an extended apprehension (ibid., pp. 84-85).
Table 4. Typology of points of view in terms of strategies to optimize the recovery of
intent by apprehension (Fontanille, 2006, p. 85)
Intense Intent Weakened Intent
Extended Apprehension Englobing strategy Cumulative strategy
Restricted Apprehension Elective strategy Particularizing strategy
The two different approaches in the use of tensive correlation are not to be conflated. The
first approach (Table 3) has to do with modes of presence: how what is sensibly present in the plane
of expression relates to what is present at a subjective level in the plane of content. For example,
while looking at the statue of the David, its size may suggest to me that the statue is about a
magnanimous figure, or upon noticing that it is placed in a prominent place in the city fo Florence,
that the statue must be important to the identity of the city. The use of the first approach is
illustrated in the example on irony (Section 3.3.2). The second approach (Table 4), has to do with
how I choose to experience sensibly a semiotic object. I might stare at the face of the David and feel
that the face alone represents the whole of the statue (elective strategy), or look at it from its feet to
its head in order to get a more detailed impression of the statue as a whole (a cumulative strategy).
3.2.2. Definition 2: Modes of existence and modalities
Fontanille agrees with Greimas on the use of modalities to define modes of existence. As Table 5
shows, the definitions of the virtual, actualized and realized modes of existence remain identical to
Greimas’s own (see Section 2.1), while the modalities of adhering and believing are introduced to
define the potentialized mode (Fontanille, 2006, p. 118)—adhering refers to “believing (in)
someone” and believing to “believing in something” (ibid.). Note that in terms of modalities,
Fontanille makes no distinction between virtual and virtualized (2006, p. 199).
Table 5. Definition of modes of existence in terms of modalities
according to Fontanille (2006, p. 118)
modes of
existence virtual actualized potentialized realized
exotactic: having-to being-able adhering causing-to-be
endotactic: wanting knowing believing being
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3.2.3. Definition 3: Explanatory definition of modes of existence and co-existence
In addition to the two previous definitions, Fontanille provides explanatory definitions for each
mode of existence which we are quoting directly (2006, pp. 199-200), in part because we find some
of them to be unclear:
 virtual mode: “is that of the structures of an underlying system, of a formal competence
available at the moment of the production of meaning”. This definition is compatible with
Greimas’s own.
 actualized mode: “is that of the forms that come about in discourse, and the conditions for
their coming about”. This definition could be understood as being compatible with
Greimas’s account, but Fontanille adds: “the actualization of a coloring in an image, for
example, entails the whole set of tensions and contrasts into which it enters, by virtue of its
coexistence with neighboring colorings”. This no longer seems to be related to being-able-
to-do and/or knowing-how-to-do.
 realized mode: is that through which “enunciation makes forms of discourse meet up with a
reality, a material reality of the plane of expression, a reality of the natural world and of the
sensible world for the content plane”. This definition too is compatible with Greimas’s own.
 potentialized mode: “a form is said to be potentialized when its diffusion or its recognition
is such that it can figure as a site of discourse (type, commonplace, or motive, available for
other convocations)”. This definition seems to be related to remembering, to memory, or to
an accumulation of knowledge. However, in my view, the feature of being “available for
other convocations” (being-able-to-be-again) makes it easy to confuse with the actualized
mode (defined by the modalities being-able-to-do, knowing-how-to-do).
Two important issues can be raised on these definitions. The first one is that Fontanille does
not seem to provide any systematic manner to differentiate the virtual from the virtualized mode.
Fontanille contends that the semiotic subject cannot remove itself from the field of discourse back
into the structures of the system (the virtual) once realized. Reasonable as this claim seems, the rest
of the theoretical system does not seem to support it or explain it: it can not be accounted for in
terms of intent and apprehension (Definition 1), nor in terms of modalities (Definition 2).
The second issue is that there seems to be an ambiguity in the definition of the potentialized
and actualized modes. The two are clearly distinguishable in terms of intent and apprehension, but
the relation between the potentialized and the modality of believing/adhering is not definitely
explained. Furthermore, as we shall illustrate in the example of the rabbit-duck illusion (Section
3.4), one can question the extent to which they are applied consistently.
3.3. Example IV: Applications of intent and apprehension
3.3.1. The subject on a quest
Fontanille provides an example of applying intent and apprehension in the tensive correlation to the
subject on a quest using the first approach, where modes of existence are construed as modes of
presence (Table 3). The subject on a quest starts with a subject that intends an object with high
intensity, but with low apprehension, given that s/he does not yet possess it. This combination,
according to Table 3, corresponds to an actualized mode of existence. This, however, differs from
the mode of existence that would result from Greimas’s definition in terms of modalities (Section
2.1), according to which a Subject with a desire expressed by the modalities of wanting-to-do
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and/or having-to-do is in a virtual mode respect to this desire/intention/object of value. This does
not point to the incorrectness of one of the two definitions, but rather to the fact that the two mean
different things by “modes of existence”: the first one refers to the intentional relation between the
subject and the object, the second one to the conjunction or disjunction between a Subject and its
Object.
3.3.2. Irony
The definition of modes of existence in terms of intent and apprehension is also deployed by
Fontanille to understand figures of rhetoric such as irony. Consider that Mary says to James
ironically: “That’s smart!”. From Mary’s stance, or from James’s stance once he interpreted the
irony, the positive content (“that’s smart”) is potentialized: it enjoys extended apprehension because
it is literally what the utterance asserts, but it is weakly intended since irony is actually pointing to
the negative content (“that’s stupid/silly/not very smart”). Thus, the negative content is actualized
because it is strongly intended but with restricted apprehension (ibid., p. 89).
It can be interesting to contrast this approach with that of Greimas in two different ways. First,
in terms of the modes of existence of the positive and negative contents. When James first hears the
utterance, the positive content is realized while the negative content is virtual (we don’t know if he
will notice the irony). An instant later, once James understands the irony, the positive content is
actualized (it can be entertained again whenever desired), while the negative content is realized.
Second, the interpretation process of irony can be outlined using narrative semiotics as illustrated in
Figure 6. It differs from the classical subject on a quest where the Subject usually starts empty
handed, as it were, disjoined from the Object that determines it. In this case the virtual mode
implies that S is already conjoined with the positive content of the utterance. Other factors in the act
of enunciating the utterance such as intonation, context and gestuality act as a Helper actant. They
provide the Subject with the being-able-to-be-conjoined with a different interpretation, the one that
assumes the negative content of the utterance. This explanation of the interpretation of irony is
causal (rather than experiential); it does not indicate the experience that one has interpreting irony
nor the order in which semantic operations are performed. It does point out why some people fail to
grasp irony: they are often incapable of relating the utterance to its context of enunciation, or to
integrate additional information such as intonation to the semantic content of the utterance.
Figure 6. Greimas’s theory of modes of existence applied to irony. The Subject is first conjoined with
the positive content X of the utterance U, but considering the intonation, context and gestuality in its
perception of the utterance leads the Subject to interpret it in the opposite sense (~X).
Why can irony be particularly hurtful or irritating? This can be understood from Fontanille’s
notion of co-existence: in the case of irony it is not simply the final interpretation we assign to it
that counts, but rather the contrast between the positive and negative contents that are entertained at
the same time with different levels of intent. From Greimas we can draw that the actual utterance
expressing irony constitutes an Object of value for an interpreting subject. For example, if John has
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a complex about not being intelligent, telling him: “That was particularly clever of you” can be
more hurtful than plainly telling him that what he did was silly. This is because being intelligent is
the Object of value, one with which John might believe he is in disjunction, and in the worst case he
might believe it impossible for him to do anything to remedy that. Thus irony poses John as being
conjoined with the Object of value in a simulacrum, but it actually implies John’s inability to attain
realization.
3.4. Example V: The rabbit-duck illusion
The rabbit-duck illusion, illustrated in Figure 7, is a classic example of how different consistent
interpretations of the same image are possible. In Section 3.2 (Definition 3) it was explained that in
Fontanille’s account, signification is produced by simultaneous transitions along the ascending and
descending trajectories. Fontanille argues that the rabbit-duck illusion is an example of “classical
commutation”—for “the rabbit brings about the disappearance of the duck and vice versa”—and
that the transitions taking place are: (1) from actualized to realized, and (2) from potentialized to
virtualized (2006, p. 201).
Figure 7. The rabbit-duck illusion (Weisstein, 2020)
First, we argue that Fontanille is wrong in the two transitions he attributes to the rabbit-duck
illusion, precisely because he is right in saying that this illusion is a case of commutation. By
definition, a commutative operation is symmetrical in that the result will be the same regardless of
the order in which the terms of the operation are considered. This is our experience when we look at
the figure of the rabbit-duck. Once we have been able to identify both, if we am interpreting the
figure as referring to a rabbit, we can easily switch and interpret it as referring to a duck. This can
be done back and forth indefinitely. Let us assume, for a moment, that the transitions that Fontanille
propposes—(A>>R) and (P>>V)—are the case. If we are interpreting the figure as a rabbit, then the
rabbit is realized, and the duck must be virtualized. If we now want to shift and interpret the figure
as a duck, then the duck would actually be transitioning from being virtualized to being realized.
But this does not correspond to the pairs of transitions Fontanille asserts, neither is it commutative:
assuming first that we interpret the figure as a rabbit or as a duck will yield a different transition on
the other side.
We can go deeper into the sequence of actions in this example by means of the following
hypothetic, yet realistic, scenario:
1. Mary is walking by the street, and she sees for the first time the rabbit-duck image painted
in a very big wall.
2. Mary stops and stares at the picture, and though she has not done it yet, she is convinced
that she will manage to make sense of it, to recognize familiar forms.
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3. Upon looking at the image for a while, Mary recognizes first the shape of a duck. “It is a
duck!”, she thinks.
4. Mary notices that the drawing of the duck seems to be tricky, and suspects there may be
other figures she has not recognized yet.
5. Some more time transpires, and Mary says: “yes, now I can see it is a rabbit too!”.
6. Although satisfied with having found two animals in the figure, Mary suspends these
interpretations and stares carefully at the figure again, but she does not find any other
animals.
7. Nevertheless Mary is amused with her discovery, so she then shifts her interpretation from
rabbit to duck, and then back to rabbit. Having recognized both figures already she does
this effortlessly.
This process is illustrated in Figure 8 using the FSA method applying the modal definition of
modes of existence. Once the rabbit or the duck have been recognized in the figure, if they are not
realized at a given time, they remain realizable and therefore actualized, since having interpreted
the figure as a rabbit/duck once allows me to do so again at will. Unlike Fontanille’s suggested
transitions, this figure does in fact represent a commutation from realized to actualized, and from
actualized to realized, once both duck and rabbit have been recognized.
Figure 8. Graph for the process of recognizing forms in the rabbit-duck figure and the
corresponding modes of existence (D: duck, R: rabbit)
In this example, all states/modes of existence can be termination states. That is to say that
Mary can abort the process of finding the duck or the rabbit at any point of the process. Even as she
walked by the street, Mary could have just noticed the figure without stopping by, hence
terminating the process at this first state. Termination states are denoted by double concentric
circles. An automaton in general is also given by its transition function; that is, the function that
maps the input and the present state to the next state. This function is not represented in the figure
because the event that occurs for Marry to pass from recognizing only the duck to recognizing the
rabbit is a cognitive process, and such processes lie outside the concern of this article. It is the
possible states, and the possible transitions from one state to another that Figure 8 focuses on. In
this example, rather than determining modes of existence a priori, we have identified the different
states of the process of interpretation of the rabbit-duck illusion by means of a thought experiment,
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and from that basis identified the corresponding modes of existence using the definition of modes of
existence based on modalities, given in Table 1, repeated below as Table 6 for the ease of the reader.
Table 6 (identical to Table 1). Definition of modes of existence in terms of modalities
according to Greimas (Greimas & Courtés, 1979/1990, p. 132)
Competence Performance
modes of
existence virtual actualized realized
modalities: virtualizing actualizing realizing
exotactic: having-to being-able causing-to-be
endotactic: wanting knowing being
4. Towards a robust narrative account
4.1. Reviewing the perspectives on modes of existence
Our endeavour in the course of this article has been to provide a succinct, yet faithful account, of
three perspectives on modes of existence, and how these relate to each other. The first perspective
concerns the relation between the system and the system put into practice, which results in the
acknowledgement of two fundamental modes of existence: virtual and realized.
Greimas took the consequences of this first perspective one step further when he articulated it
with the concepts of competence and performance in his narrative semiotics, the second perspective.
A mediating mode, the actualized, was then introduced in between the virtual and the realized.
Actualization makes sense only insofar modes of existence are understood in the context of a
Subject that has an intention of action; namely, to attain an Object of desire, where becoming
conjoined with the intention (i.e., realization) presupposes performance, and performance in turn
presupposes competence. Consequently, we argue, the definition of modes of existence from the
perspective of narrative semiotics is neither equivalent nor replaceable by that of tensive semiotics,
as Fontanille and Zilberberg (2017, p. 125) suggest. The reason is that Greimas’s narrative
perspective constitutes a system of teleological causation (Charles, 2012; Stein, 2011) insofar as the
process by which a Subject becomes conjoined with an Object (or intention) is ordered as a series of
presuppositions, and driven by a final cause (the “that for the sake of which”), i.e., intention itself.
Representing “X presupposes Y” as “X>Y” we have the series of presuppositions shown in (8):
(8) realization of intention > performance > competence > intention.
Note how in (8) intention is present both in the end result of the process (realization) and in
the early stage when an intention is established (i.e., in the virtual mode). This double role of
intention, which translates to intention being an efficient cause and a final cause, is represented by
Greimas in the double apparition of the actant Sender: first at the beginning to form an intention in
the Receiver/Subject, and then at the end of the narrative to sanction the Subject’s performance,
hence determining whether or not the Subject’s intention becomes realized. Going back to
Michelangelo (Section 2.8), had his intention been to sculpt a statue that he would have been
satisfied with himself, finishing the sculpture would not have sufficed, he would also have to have
liked it—i.e., the same actor Michelangelo would have occupied three actantial roles: Subject,
Receiver and Sender. This is precisely the advantage with describing narrative/action processes in
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terms of teleological causation: causal relations hold the form of hypothetical necessity (i.e.,
presupposition), rather than forward entailment (Charles, 2012). For example, if a performance was
successful (hypothesis), it is necessarily the case that the Subject had the required competence
relative to its intention. The converse, however—i.e., given that the Subject has acquired a
competence relative to an intention, a successful performance will follow—is not necessarily true.
This accords well with the nature of narratives (e.g., a crime story with explicit determinations from
the start is hardly of any interest) and with many intentional actions in that it allows for contingency.
Given that the narrative perspective on modes of existence constitutes a system of
teleological causation—i.e., a system in which modes hold precise relations to each other given by
presupposition and supported by the consistent use of modalities—we take narrative semiotics as
the framework on which to base a systematic theory of modes of existence. Moreover, the narrative
perspective is, we claim, capable of addressing the following aspects that are also central for tensive
semiotics:
1. Tensive semiotics construes modes of existence as modulations of presence, where the degree
of presence is determined by the relations between what is sensibly given to the subject and the
resulting interpretations, i.e., in terms of the tensive correlation of intent and apprehension
(Section 3.2, Def. 1, Table 2). This can, however, be described with comparable clarity in
terms of modalities and actants that lead towards (or away from) competence and junction, as
the example on irony in Section 3.3 made plain.
2. Tensive semiotics identifies the need for the notion of ascending and descending trajectories as
tensions from the virtual to the realized, and from the realized to the virtualized, respectively.
Transitions along both these trajectories can be handled perfectly well in narrative semiotics,
as the examples of Michelangelo (Section 2.8) and the rabbit-duck illusion (Section 3.4)
showcased.
3. Even what we regard as the most original contribution of tensive semiotics, which in our view
is the one least exploited in Fontanille’s Semiotics of Discourse (2006), fits neatly with
narrative semiotics. Namely, given a point of view, intent and apprehension are regulated
respect to each other by means of different strategies (Table 3). For a given narrative/action
process, one could determine the transition between modes of existence using the narrative
perspective, and associate each to a specific strategy. For example, the case of Hamlet,
developed from a narrative perspective in Section 2.7, demonstrated the affective intensity of
the Ghost’s figure on prince Hamlet in the mode of possibility. This could be in turn correlated
with the extended apprehension that Hamlet has of the Ghost when he has it right in front of
him, and a similar procedure could be carried out for each mode in the narrative.
4. Tensive semiotics acknowledges the “thickness” of discourse that relies on the coexistence of
different objects or interpretations at a given time, each in a different mode, and each exerting
different levels of “pressure” to become realized depending on this mode. The case of the
rabbit-duck illusion (Section 3.4) showed that this too can be expounded from the perspective
of narratives semiotics, where the interpretations of duck and rabbit were found to coexist, one
realized and the other one actualized, as the subject commutes easily from one to the other.
4.2. A robust narrative account on modes of existence
In what follows, we address what we consider to be inconsistencies in the narrative and tensive
perspectives on modes of existence as Greimas and Fontanille formulate them. Next, we provide a
more robust account on the basis of narrative semiotics.
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One of the limitations common to both narrative and tensive semiotics in regard to modes of
existence is that the relation between the potentialized mode and its corresponding modality of
believing/adhering to (Table 5) remains unclear. In narrative semiotics the potentialized is
hesitantly invoked to account for the capacity to run simulacra; in tensive semiotics it is defined as
the mediator in the transition from the realized to the virtualized. Rather than engaging in a dispute
over the correct definition of the potentialized, we take the most valuable import to be the idea that
an intention can move not only towards the realized (in the ascending trajectory), but likewise away
from it (in the descending trajectory). Hence the importance of the FSA method, which allows us to
identify all of the modes of existence traversed in a particular narrative/action process, as well as all
possible transitions in both directions from any mode to any other.
Before providing a general account of modes of existence, however, it is necessary to address
an ambiguity in the relation between conjunction and disjunction. Namely, what is the fundamental
difference between not-disjoined and conjoined, and between not-conjoined and disjoined? To
address this problem we resort to defining the actant Subject’s narrative trajectory (i.e., its process
of intentional action) in terms of competence and junction. At first, both variables could be regarded
as binary: the Subject either has a competence (C=1) or they do not (C=0), the Subject is either
conjoined with the Object (J=1) or else they do not (J=0). We propose, however, that a third
possible value be introduced for competence: an indeterminate value (C=e), which is what will
define the virtual mode of existence as such. We define the virtual mode as that in which the
Subject and the Object are disjoined (J=0) and the competence is undetermined (C=e). Assuming
that indeterminate competence can only be the property of a Subject right at the beginning of the
narrative/action process (i.e., in the virtual mode) provides an effective solution to the problem of
formalizing Fontanille’s remark that one can never return to the virtual mode (to the structures of
the system) once the Subject has started the narrative/action process. Assigning three possible
values to competence and two to junction results in six possible combinations, as Table 7 shows.
Each of these can be related to define modes of existence, while being compatible with Greimas’s
modal definitions (Table 1). Note that the unrealized mode—the combination of no competence
and no junction (0,0)—could be regarded as equivalent to Fontanille’s virtualized. The combination
of indeterminate competence together with junction (e,1), however, is considered to be impossible,
though this might be a matter to explore further. Finally, when the Subject achieves junction with
the Object after performing, it might be that competence is retained after performance—thus
making the performance repeatable as in (1,1)—or that although junction has been achieved, the
Subject no longer has the competence to perform again, i.e., (0,1).
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Table 7.Modes of existence defined according to the values of competence and junction
(e: undetermined, 1: present, 0: absent).
Competence (C) Junction (J) Mode of existence
e 0 virtual 1
e 1 impossible? -
1 0 actualized 2
1 1 realized 3
0 0 unrealized 4
0 1 realized(not repeatable) 3
Four different modes of existence were identified in Table 7. What follows is the
specification of all possible/impossible transitions between them considering the mode of possibility
as well. This is shown in Figure 9 using the method of FSA.
Figure 9.Modes of existence and possible transitions between them represented according to the
method of finte state automata, and defined according to modalities based on Table 1.
A few remarks are in order. First, regarding mobility: recall that the double circle in FSA
represents a terminal state, that is, a state which does not require any further transitions. When
playing chess, for example (Section 2.6), we saw that in every move taken by a chess player a very
large number of games becomes unrealized (U); furthermore, they remain unrealized: U in this case
is a terminal state. Consider, in contrast, the case of Michelangelo sculpting the David in Section
2.8. Michelangelo might have had a nervous breakdown that renders him unable to perform (thus
arriving at U). Nevertheless, Michelangelo was strong enough to recover and to continue sculpting,
which means that his intention transitioned back to the actualized mode (A). To the best of our
knowledge, this property of modes of existence, which we shall name mobility, has not been
discussed in the literature in (post)Greimasian semiotics. It is not only important to determine which
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modes of existence intervene in a specific narrative/action process, or what are the possible
transitions between them; it must also be specified whether or not the process continues if it arrives
at a given mode, and what event does this mobility or immobility depend on—in the case of
Michelangelo, it depended on his health recovery.
Second, Figure 9 shows a small circle between the virtual and the actualized, and a similar
circle between the actualized and the realized. This is to indicate that some action/narrative
processes can have a fluent transition between the virtual and the actualized—as is the case when
playing chess, where every play constitutes gaining competence and performing to fulfill the
intention of a checkmate—or between the actualized and the realized—as happened to
Michelangelo, who sculpted the David in the course of three years, rather than sculpting the whole
figure at once. Moreover, the example of Michelangelo, developed graphically in Section 2.8,
shows the possibility of transitioning from in between the actualized and the realized (sculpting) to
in between the virtual and the actualized (gaining competence, for example studying anatomy).
Third, the dotted arrows in Figure 9 denote transitions along the descending trajectory. As the
figure shows, these transitions are not only two in number as Fontanille maintained, but add up to
nine due to the inclusion of the mode of possibility. The justification for including this mode is that
in order to properly describe intentional action, we must account for the possibility of questioning,
giving up, or modifying an intention; only in this way can we go back to the virtual. Fontanille
construed movements along the descending trajectory as the fixing of living forms into stereotypes,
and apparently therefore related the potentialized to the modalities of belief. These fixings, as well
as the possibility of integrating newly discovered competences or strategies of performance given
an intention, can in deed be accounted for if we state that competence—especially in the form of
knowing-how-to-do—is accumulated by the Subject as it traverses all the different modes in their
process of intentional action. The knowing-how is not statically “remembered” (skills such as
sculpting or playing chess are not), but it becomes embodied, as it were, and capable of being
recalled in further performances, even if it is altered by factors such as time.
5. Conclusion
Should this work be granted any merit, it will not be the discovery of a ground breaking semiotic
concept that illuminates the theorizing of modes of existence. Its contribution rather lies at having
dwelt into that which was already there, namely the perspectives of narrative and tensive semiotics
on this subject matter. Many accomplished theoretical accounts pay little importance to examples;
we have striven for the opposite. We believe all of the examples this work has dealt with have
demonstrated both the pertinence of narrative semiotics to define modes of existence, its capability
to deal with many of the concerns raised by tensive semiotics, as well as the ease and clarity that the
method of finite state automata brings to identify the possible transitions for any given mode. Some
of the most relevant contributions of this work are the following:
1. Competence was redefined as having three possible values, where the third one implies
indetermination, and is propper of the virtual mode. This resulted in 5 different modes of
existence counting the mode of possibility, all of which have been precisely defined in terms of
modalities.
2. The mode of possibility proved useful in the context of intentional action, since it allows the
intensity of sensible encounter in the formation of intention to be taken into account. In
addition, it is connected to several feedback loops constituted by other modes pointing towards
it.
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3. The method of finite state automata was not only of great value in characterizing the different
action/narrative processes. The concept of terminal state allowed us to determine a property of
modes of existence that has received little or no attention: their mobility.
The skeptic might wonder if it is really necessary to bring in a method from computer science
into semiotics. Upon a closer look, however, Greimas’s method of the semiotic square (which, like
finite state automata, is both graphical and conceptual) was devised with a strong influence from
mathematics (Corso, 2014), and it became the cornerstone of the formulation of the “deep
structures” of the trajectory from the intelligible to the sensible (Greimas & Rastier, 1968).
Likewise, the change in paradigm of tensive semiotics respect to narrative semiotics was possible
thanks to the two-dimensional function of gradients of intensity vs gradients of extent (Fontanille &
Zilberberg, 2017; Hebért, 2006b). Our claim is that the conceptual power of narrative syntax, on the
other hand, has not been worked out to its full consequences due to the lack of a method that brings
both conceptual and representational clarity. Furthermore, modes of existence do not belong to the
level of deep structures such as the semiotic square or tensive correlations, neither to the surface
level where the manifestation of the sensible world takes place. Rather, they lie somewhere in
between, and both the semiotics of Greimas and Fontanille agree that the production of signification
depends on the possible transitions from one mode of existence to another; that is to say,
signification depends on a syntax of modes of existence. Hence our contention, supported by the
many examples developed in this work, is that the method of finite state automata proves to be an
outstanding candidate (if not the best, for we know not of any alternatives) to fulfill this task.
This study has also shown that there does not seem to be a consistent usage of the
potentialized mode, neither in the Semiotics of Passions (Greimas & Fontanille, 1991) nor in
Fontanille’s semiotics of discourse. Given that from the narrative perspective the examples were
solved without referring to this mode, it is left for further study if the potentialized mode is in fact
required as a distinct mode, or if it suffices to keep the more general concept it refers to: that there
is a trajectory towards and away from the realized. If the former alternative is chosen, the relation
between the potentialized mode and the modalities of believing/adhering to must be unequivocally
defined.
As regards to future work, we would like to suggest two plausible hypotheses that spring
from the robust account of modes of existence. First, Greimas’s model of the subject on a quest,
including the mode of possibility, seems to agree with theories of intentional action from analytic
philosophy. Wu (2011, 2017), for example, defines intentional action as the solution of a selection
problem where, from a myriad of possibilities, only certain inputs (perceptual and mental) are
matched to an output (behavior itself). This is congruent with the canonical schema of the subject
on a quest, where the subject is presented with a space of possibilities in the virtual mode, and as
the subject gains competence, performance (Wu’s output) becomes that which determines the
success, failure or the necessary adjustments for intentional action. On the other hand, Fontanille’s
notion of the coexistence of interpretations or mental states, each in a different mode of existence,
seems to accord with Wu’s understanding of attention as a structure of priorities that is guided by
perceptual and cognitive inputs. The second hypothesis is about tending a bridge between Fontanille
and Landowski’s semiotics by means of the robust account of modes of existence. Landowski’s
approach to the sensible and the aesthetic relies on four regimes—i.e., accident, regularity, junction
and adjustment (Landowski, 2017). While the regime of junction corresponds the narrative
semiotics presented in Section 2, the regime of adjustment refers to the interaction between two
subjects interacting and thus forming together their intentions of action, without any manipulation
of one over other, both adjusting to each other. In our view, the regime of adjustment is suitable to
be analyzed using the method of finite state automata considering all the modes of existence of the
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robust account incorporating the compatible features of tensive semiotics (Section 4.2). This would
establish a link between the semiotics of Greimas, Landowski and Fontanille.
Finally, modes of existence is a complex subject that underlies (post)Greimasian semiotics.
This work hopes to awaken interest upon it with the theoretical reviews, claims, criticisms and
further lines of enquiry that have been suggested, along with the method introduced to develop a
syntax of modes of existence.
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